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John Paul II and Christian Personalism vs. Peter Singer and 
Utilitarianism: Two Radically Opposed Conceptions of the 
Nature and Meaning of Sufferingi 
 
By Peter J. Colosi 
St Charles Borromeo Seminary 
Abstract 
Although Christian ethics and contemporary utilitarianism both employ 
terms such as “love” and “compassion”, they are in fact polar opposite 
ethical views. This fact is not at all easy to discern.  One key to perceiving 
the radical opposition between them lies in clarifying their respective 
concepts of suffering. In the Christian view, suffering is always understood 
as the suffering of individual persons, while in utilitarianism suffering is 
primarily understood as a quantifiable entity detached from the individuals 
who experience it. The paper attempts a primarily philosophical elucidation 
of this difference, including some theological points, by taking as its point 
of departure John Paul II’s presentation of the three-fold sense in which 
suffering has the potential to “unleash of love.” Following a presentation of 
the utilitarian view, it then proceeds to explore the relation between 
suffering and love by probing the public statements on the experience of 
Peter Singer in the struggle with his mother’s debilitating illness. The paper 
concludes with the presentation of a premise built into the structure of 
contemporary utilitarian ethics rendering it inherently self-defeating with 
respect to its own stated goal. 
 
1. The Meaning of Suffering According to Pope John Paul II 
 
From time immemorial humanity has sought to discover a meaning in 
suffering, and many deep answers have been given, some partial and 
others more full. For example, The Book of Job teaches that while suffering 
is rightly understood as punishment due in justice to a wrong-doer, 
nonetheless, the innocent suffer also, as a test of their faithfulness.ii In 
more recent times, we have the profound work of Viktor Frankl who told 
us that hidden in the depths of the worst types of suffering there is a task 
to be discovered related to the fulfilment of one’s unrepeatable earthly 
vocation. 
In asking the question, “What is the reason for suffering?” one could 
understand the word “reason” in two senses. First, one could mean by 
“reason,” “cause.” In this sense the question is searching for what it is that 
Ethics Education Volume 15, No 1 2009 
 
21

brought suffering into existence at all. I think there are two answers to the 
question in this sense; one is accessible with faith, and the other is 
understandable to all persons of good will. Faith teaches that the 
combination of demons and original sin account for suffering, and on a 
natural level one sees the fact that we human persons do not love each 
other enough as its cause.iii 
Once suffering exists in the world, however, one can ask about its 
“reason” in a second sense. Given its existence, one can ask about the 
inner meaning of suffering, how it relates to other aspects of our lives, and 
what our response to it should be? 
In this second sense of the “reason” for suffering, perhaps the most 
concise, straightforward answer to the question was given by Pope John 
Paul II when he said that “Suffering is…present in order to unleash love.”iv 
This “unleashing” is meant by the Pope in a three-fold sense: 1) In the 
interior life of persons as the opening of a certain interior disposition of the 
heart, a sensitivity of heart which has an emotional expression unique to it,v 
2) Externally, giving birth to works of love towards neighbor,vi 3) and 
culturally, transforming the whole of human civilization into a civilization of 
love.vii 
Many authors of recent times, including John Paul II, have developed the 
point that persons ought never to be conceived of as a means to an end, 
no matter how noble that end.viii Responding to another person as an end, 
in the minds of these authors means respecting another person for that 
other’s own sake, because of their inner worth and preciousness.  Related 
to that is the interesting relationship that if one person does respect 
another as an end, it also happens that, as a surprising fruit of such respect, 
moral values and happiness spring up in the inner life of the one who 
shows such respect. This is sometimes expressed in the surprise of 
volunteer health care aids when they say, “I received so much more from 
those whom I served than I could ever have given to them!” Along these 
lines, John Paul II perceives something internal to the very nature of 
suffering itself that is conducive to the realization of love; in fact, he goes 
so far as to say that “…man owes to suffering that unselfish love which 
stirs in his heart and actions.”ix Thus, we might want to say that although 
persons ought never to be conceived of as mere means to the achievement 
of any end (even love and happiness), it nevertheless seems that there is 
some sort of mysterious ordination within suffering to achieve the end of 
the flourishing of love. Incidentally, we ought not be too quick to assume 
that those who help the suffering are the only ones who grow in this 
interior experience of love. Indeed, sometimes it is a more difficult 
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challenge for the suffering one to grow in love towards the one who helps 
him – this presupposes, for example, a profound humility to accept the 
help and to be thankful. 
This point, that the flourishing of love is a kind of side-effect, is important 
because if one held that the ultimate meaning (in the sense of raison 
d’être) of suffering were its ability to cause love to flourish, then it seems 
that one comes too close to reducing persons in their suffering to a mere 
means to the achievement of other ends, and also to the view that love 
ultimately depends on the existence of evil.x The character of Ivan, in The 
Brother’s Karamazov, rightly rebels against this notion when he wants to 
give back his ticket into heaven if it depends on the suffering of a child.xi 
For example, if little children who are sexually abused, tortured and then 
killed, end up in heaven, then pointing to that result as an exhaustive 
explanation for the child’s suffering is not acceptable.xii Perhaps it is for this 
reason that the Pope says that the mystery of suffering is “an especially 
impenetrable one.”xiii 
While I see no easy solution to the problem of innocent suffering, it seems 
that we are able to give an answer, even if not exhaustive, to the question 
about the inner meaning of suffering if we relate it to love: In the care and 
respect generously given to those who suffer, and generously accepted by 
them, it seems there is a power that has as its fruit the flourishing of love. 
With respect to innocent suffering, one could say, I think, that if this side-
effect of the flourishing of love were to become wide-spread, certainly 
deliberate hurting of the innocent would tend towards extinction.xiv 
2. The Utilitarian Conception of Suffering 
 
Another attempt at an answer to the question about the meaning of 
suffering, this one from the 18th and 19th centuries, has been given by the 
ethical movement known as utilitarianism. This ethical theory found its first 
well worked-out defense in Jeremy Bentham’s An Introduction to the 
Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789). Subsequently, John Stuart Mill 
developed a vigorous philosophical defense of utilitarianism against 
Bentham’s critics in his Utilitarianism (1863) and also, to a lesser extent, in 
his earlier On Liberty (1859). This view has its most famous and perhaps 
most logically consistent contemporary proponent in Professor Peter Singer 
of the University Center for Human Values at Princeton University, and for 
this reason I will primarily analyse his thought as representative of this view. 
Although Christian ethics and utilitarianism both employ terms such as 
“love” and “compassion”, they are in fact polar opposite ethical views. 
This fact is not at all easy to discern.xv Yet, it seems that the key to 
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perceiving clearly the radical opposition between them lies in clarifying the 
concept of suffering in each view. In the Christian view, suffering is always 
understood as the suffering of individual persons, while in utilitarianism 
suffering is primarily understood as a quantifiable entity detached from the 
individuals who experience it. 
Three basic principles make up utilitarian ethics. The consequentialist 
principle, which states that “the rightness, or wrongness, of an action is 
determined by the goodness, or badness of the results that flow from it.”xvi 
Secondly, the hedonist principle, which states that “the only thing that is 
good in itself is pleasure and the only thing bad in itself is pain.”xvii Finally, 
the principle of extent, which takes into account the number of people 
affected by the action.xviii The following simple formulation of ethical 
utilitarianism emerges: the rightness of an action is determined by its 
contribution to the happiness (pleasure) of the greatest number of people 
affected by it. 
The principle of extent distinguishes utilitarianism from basic hedonism. A 
strict hedonist would agree with the consequentialist and the hedonistic 
principles, but would reject the principle of extent, saying, “those actions 
are right which increase my pleasure.” A utilitarian, by contrast, takes into 
account the pleasure of the greatest number of people concerned, 
calculating himself in as no more or less important than one unit who can 
experience pleasure. John Stuart Mill encapsulates this idea: 
…the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is 
right in conduct, is not the agent’s own happiness, but that of 
all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of 
others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a 
disinterested and benevolent spectator.xix 
 
Peter Singer is committed to these principles, though he does not speak of 
“pleasure fulfillment,” as classical utilitarianism does, but rather of 
“preference fulfillment,”xx and “interest fulfillment,” saying, “we define 
‘interests’ broadly enough, so that we count anything people desire as in 
their interests”.xxi Of all people who can experience the desire to have their 
preferences fulfilled, a calculation ought to be made in order to discern 
which act will result in the satisfaction of the most preferences. That action 
ought to be chosen.xxii Singer sees all other considerations, which propose 
not doing that act which would increase the overall welfare, as either 
selfish, or constraining true morality.xxiii 
Singer accepts as morally relevantxxiv what we could call “suffering as a 
quantifiable entity.” Suffering in this sense is morally relevant because it is 
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the contrary opposite of the only good: pleasure – or as Singer would say, 
preference fulfillment. His view, I think, could be represented by saying that 
if we could stick a thermometer into the world which would measure the 
amount of over-all suffering, then a right action is any one which makes 
the needle go down. His commitment to this view leads him to make 
assertions that seem shocking to some. For example, he thinks that 
concern for one’s own leisure or enjoyment,xxv and concern for one’s own 
familyxxvi often constitute moral failure, since actions based on these 
concerns do not maximize preference fulfillment for the greatest number 
of people. In addition, action based on the criterion of the absolute moral 
norms of traditional ethics may also constitute moral failure, since such 
actions at times do not maximize preference fulfillment. Singer boldly 
states, 
…from trite rules against lying and stealing to such noble 
constructions as justice and human rights…when the 
debunked principles have been scrutinized, found wanting, 
and cleared away, we will be left with nothing but the 
impartial rationality of the principle of equal consideration of 
interests.xxvii 
 
This view also leads Singer to draw the surprising conclusion that the 
behavior of Blessed Mother Teresa of Calcutta was irrational, indeed he 
might say immoral, 
 
Mother Teresa described her love for others as love for each of 
a succession of individuals, rather than “love of mankind, 
merely as such.” If we were more rational, we would be 
different: we would use our resources to save as many lives as 
possible, irrespective of whether we do it by reducing the road 
toll or by saving specific, identifiable lives.xxviii 
 
It seems to me that Singer perceives a mutually exclusive and competitive 
relationship between the following two types of love, 
 
A. Individual love in which two persons face each other. Mother 
Teresa’s use of the word “succession” implies that each individual 
relationship is based on an attitude of care and respect that demands 
one’s full attention before moving on to the next person. 
 
B. Non-individual love, which Singer calls “love of mankind, merely as 
such.” 
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The nature of the competition seems to be that love A, if practiced, saps 
time, energy and resources from love B. Thus, the perceived irrationality of 
practicing A is grounded in the utilitarian principle of extent: this axiom-like 
principle assumes that reducing the quantity of suffering trumps all other 
ethical concerns; and, staying with the traffic law scenario, since Mother 
Teresa is not, for example, spending her energy calculating auto accident 
rates against various speed limit options, she is not as rational as she might 
be. 
 
As it becomes clearer that utilitarian ethical theory tends to relegate 
individual love to the sidelines, the question sometimes arises why it is that 
this ethical view has such a large following.xxix There is a plausibility to it 
grounded in a kernel of truth: We do all hope that large scale suffering 
diminishes. We all hope rightly, for example, that when a natural disaster 
hits that as few people as possible are harmed. But as John Crosby points 
out, the flaw in this view is that it does not distinguish between personal 
causes and natural causes, 
 
…consequentialism teaches that, to the extent that events are 
subject to our control, we should bring about just those results 
which, when events are not subject to us, we hope for. It 
teaches that a moral agent is just as much a natural cause as 
the causes beyond our control, and should distinguish itself 
from other natural causes by being as beneficent a cause as 
possible, intervening in the world out of the same beneficence 
that it feels in the form of wishing and hoping at those times 
when it can only look on helplessly.xxx 
 
This is the reason for which utilitarian ethics tosses all absolute moral laws 
out of ethics: it sees no difference between a boulder killing a person and 
one person killing another person so long as in both cases some greater 
good resulted – and the ultimate result of this is the theoretical rejection of 
the specifically personal and inner dimension of morality, including the type 
of love exhibited by Mother Teresa. 
 
The utilitarian view of suffering, then, can be understood to split suffering 
off from the individual who suffers in order to obtain an entity which can 
be measured. Then, ethical decisions are arrived at by determining which 
action would reduce the overall amount of suffering on earth; including 
the killing of an innocent person when that single death will reduce overall 
suffering. 
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3. The Interior Unleashing of Love 
 
The Christian view, on the other hand, does not accept the severing of 
suffering from the individual who undergoes it. On the Christian view there 
are two, not just one, morally relevant factors: suffering and individual 
persons who have a lofty worth. As Dietrich von Hildebrand summarized 
well, both of these factors motivate moral action, 
 
We see a poor man in great need. The need of this man, his 
sufferings and troubles, are a disvalue. We grasp the call to do 
away with this disvalue. Our value response of love for this 
suffering man is at the basis of the negative response to his 
sufferings. Our will to help him is really motivated by the value 
of a human person, and the disvalue of his sufferings.xxxi 
  
This radical difference between the utilitarian and the Christian views of 
suffering has profound consequences with respect to the threefold sense in 
which, according to John Paul II, suffering is meant to “unleash love.” The 
utilitarian view of suffering makes this unleashing of love impossible, while 
the Christian view of suffering is able, precisely because of that unity 
between suffering and the individual person who suffers, to achieve the 
threefold release of love. 
 
Max Scheler presents the idea that in Christianity there is an internal 
change on the part of the one who gives help that is a primary dimension 
of morality, and which is lost on utilitarianism in its exclusive focus on the 
external help that the giving brings about. Scheler recalls the story of the 
rich young man who told Jesus that he has followed the commandments 
his entire life and wanted to know what more he could do to follow Him. 
Scripture tells us, 
 
Jesus, looking at him, loved him and said to him, “You are 
lacking one thing. Go, sell what you have, and give to [the] 
poor and you will have treasure in heaven; then come, follow 
me.” At that statement his face fell, and he went away sad, for 
he had many possessions.xxxii 
 
Scheler points out that, 
 
When the rich youth is told to divest himself of his riches and 
give them to the poor, it is really not in order to help the 
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“poor” and to effect a better distribution of property in the 
interest of the general welfare…The order is given because the 
act of giving away, and the spiritual freedom and abundance 
of love which manifest themselves in this act, ennoble the 
youth and make him even “richer” than he is.xxxiii 
 
Scheler’s point is that in the Christian view, full cognizance is taken 
of two incomparable goods that come about in morality: the moral 
good of the benefactor and the objective good of the recipient.xxxiv 
The help given, he points out, can be small while the love is great or 
the help great while the love is small, remarking that love is not a 
mere “institution of charity.”xxxv And John Paul II states that, 
 
…every individual must feel as if called personally to bear 
witness to love in suffering. The institutions are very important 
and indispensable; nevertheless, no institution can by itself 
replace the human heart, human compassion, human love or 
human initiative, when it is a question of dealing with the 
sufferings of another. This refers to physical sufferings, but it is 
even more true when it is a question of the many kinds of 
moral suffering, and when it is primarily the soul that is 
suffering.xxxvi 
 
John Paul II explains that it often takes a long, long time for the answer to 
our question about the meaning of suffering to become clear. He explains 
that the reason for this is that although God hears the question, He does 
not answer it directly, nor abstractly.xxxvii The answer to the question of 
suffering, namely, its presence in the world for the releasing of love, only 
becomes clear to a person by participating in suffering and making a 
personal response to it – only then is a certain interior peace and spiritual 
joy in the midst of suffering possible.xxxviii 
  
The notion that one can only understand suffering through personal 
experience relates to one such personal experience of Peter Singer, written 
about in a profile piece on him.xxxix In a rare but complete break with his 
entire philosophical corpus, Peter Singer himself glimpsed the deepest 
source of the intrinsic worth of persons. Singer’s mother, who became ill 
with Alzheimer’s disease, reached a point in her life where she no longer 
recognized Singer, his sister, or her grandchildren and she had lost the 
ability to reason. She was in a state in which, according to Singer’s theory, 
she did not meet the definition of a person.xl According to his ethical 
theory, she ought to have been killed, or been left to die, and certainly no 
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money should have been spent on her survival, since the moral calculus 
would require that such money be spent increasing the preference 
fulfillment of the greatest number of people. Instead, Singer and his sister 
hired a team of health-care aids to look after her, spending tens of 
thousands of dollars in the process.xli Michael Specter, the author of the 
piece, asked Singer about this, who first responded, in an attempt to 
remain consistent with his views, that this was “probably not the best use 
you could make of my money….”xlii However, on further probing, Singer 
said to Specter: “I think this has made me see how the issues of someone 
with these kinds of problems are really very difficult…. Perhaps it is more 
difficult than I thought before, because it is different when it’s your 
mother.”xliii Now this experience of Peter Singer with his mother can be 
analyzed philosophically, and the first thing to point out is that his actions 
coincide with the Christian view for, it is precisely when Singer gets into 
the position of reuniting suffering with a specific individual person (one 
whom he loves) that he reverses in his actions what he insists upon in his 
books. 
 
The difference, when it is your mother, is that you love her, and this is a 
highly relevant fact for a theory of ethics. Love opens one’s eyes to the true 
source of the worth of persons: their uniqueness.xliv It is precisely a glimpse 
of the unrepeatable uniqueness of another person which inspires love (the 
grasp merely of the blunt fact that another person has consciousness, for 
example, cannot inspire love for them). Once this glimpse is achieved and 
love springs forth in the soul – as it does like a surprising gift – that love 
then has the remarkable power of allowing one to see more clearly and 
deeply both the humanity and the unique preciousness of the person you 
love, and then that sight in turn inspires more love. With one’s mother this 
process of loving and seeing has occurred quite a lot and the vision of 
worth and preciousness is overwhelming.xlv When that has occurred, there 
can be no argument concerning an inability to think about one’s future 
preference fulfillment (one of Singer’s favorites)xlvi that could make a 
person kill the one they love – or in any other way abandon her. 
 
Of course, some hold the view that it is merciful to kill someone who is in 
pain; that, however, is not love, but abandonment. The request to be killed 
is actually a plea for two basic things: to be loved and to have pain relief. 
As soon as these people feel loved and/or have their pain managed, they 
no longer ask to be killed (and are grateful that their request was not 
heeded). Pain is the trump card used by pro-euthanasia activists to promote 
their cause, but in our high-tech world we have the ability to eliminate this 
reason for the request to be killed. With respect to the other reason, 
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feeling like an unloved nuisance, we must rise to the challenge presented 
by the recognition that loving each person is an infinitely higher value than 
cost management and perfect physical health. 
 
It is very important to point out that while the love you have for someone is 
one reason why you would never kill that person, it is not the deepest 
reason. The deepest reason is the inner worth of the person. Your love for 
another is inside of you, but the humanity, uniqueness and preciousness of 
others are inside them. What happens when you love someone is that you 
can see more clearly the inner worth of the other person. Other persons 
have this inner worth whether or not they are loved, so no one should kill 
them – but unless love is in the picture one might have trouble knowing 
about their inner worth. 
 
This experience of Singer has the possibility of revealing to his mind a truth 
that until now has been completely lost on utilitarians so concerned about 
the masses: the deepest source of the worth of every person lies in the very 
fact that there is no one else in existence, nor ever was, nor ever will be, 
nor could be, who is the same as another person, and among the reasons 
for the absolute inviolability of each person, this is the highest. Love has 
the power to make one know this truth about the persons one actually 
loves, but it also has the power to make one know that this is true of every 
person.xlvii It seems to me that this knowledge about the intrinsic worth of 
persons which is gained through love is accessible to believers and non-
believers in God. 
 
In a 2004 book chapterxlviii Singer responded to the reactions generated by 
this conflict between his life and his theory in the following way. He notes 
that, “My critics have claimed that, by paying for home care for my mother 
after she began to suffer from dementia, I have violated the standard of 
impartiality that I advocate.”xlix He proceeds to point out that R.M. Hare 
offered him an idea that might lead to the view that Singer’s action 
towards his mother was morally right, “R.M. Hare has suggested that 
because I know my mother well, and can see that the money being spent 
on her care does mean that she gets excellent health care, and does not 
suffer, the money is well-spent.”l Singer quickly rejects this offer and, 
surprisingly, joins the ranks of his critics – against himself:  
Suppose, however, that it were crystal clear that the money 
could do more good elsewhere. Then I would be doing wrong 
in spending it on my mother, just as I do wrong when I spend, 
on myself or my family, money that could do more good if 
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donated to an organization that helps people in much greater 
need than we are. I freely admit to not doing all that I should; 
but I could do it, and the fact that I do not do it does not 
vitiate the claim that it is what I should do.li 
 
This answer is sophistical because he implicitly equates two unequal ideas: 
on the one hand, donating money to the poor in the form of tithing, and 
on the other hand, killing someone and then donating the money you 
gained from that to the poor. 
 
Also, Singer himself admits that this position leads to “the further question 
of whether it makes sense to ask why we should act morally, and if it does, 
what kind of an answer it is possible to give…”lii Although he has written 
on this question elsewhere,liii the following set of questions comes to mind 
here, 
1. Has he learned from this experience and made a firm intention 
not to make this moral error in the future. For example, when his 
wife, children or sister become debilitated, will he do what he 
believes to be the “right thing” and kill them? 
 
2. If it is the case that his action towards his mother, while in direct 
opposition to his written work, does not negate his theories, how 
many such actions of his would it take to negate them? 
 
3. If he is convinced that he did an objective wrong against the 
greater good when he cared for his mother, does he also think 
that he has thereby incurred moral guilt by caring for her?liv 
 
Most people do not respect a teacher who doesn’t live according to the 
demands he makes on others. If Singer had said in this paragraph: “I want 
to apologize to all my followers for my error, and to assure them that if this 
same situation happens with any other family members of mine, I will not 
let you down again,” then I would in one sense be harder pressed to write 
against him now. But, since instead he wrote, “The fact that I do not do it 
[the right utilitarian act] does not vitiate the claim that it is what I should 
do,” we can conclude, I think, that he has no firm resolution not to err 
again; that is, he very well may act in just the same way with other ill family 
members; he may care for them - only time will tell. And so, why is it, we 
could wonder, that the leader of this movement is allowed to do the exact 
opposite of what he preaches - and boldly admit it - adding that none of 
this undercuts his theoretical assertions? 
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I must note one further point concerning his remark that “the fact that I do 
not do it [the right utilitarian act] does not vitiate the claim that it is what I 
should do.” That remark is meant to blunt his critics who hold up his care 
for his mother against his theory as a blatant contradiction, but in the 
opening lines of Practical Ethics Singer himself asserts that “…ethics is not 
an ideal system that is noble in theory but no good in practice. The reverse 
is closer to the truth: an ethical judgment that is no good in practice must 
suffer from a theoretical defect…”lv Singer is famous for following his first 
principles all the way to their (extreme) logical conclusions, well, it seems 
that it is not only his critics who think that his action towards his mother 
vitiates his ethical theory, he does too! Will he follow this text to its logical 
conclusion and drop his theory, since it is no good in his very own practice? 
These questions and the contradictions in Singer’s thought are important, 
but even they do not approach the real problem. The real problem is 
expressed in the following question, 
 
4. Why can’t Singer take the step from his experience with his 
mother to see that Mother Teresa’s way of life is the most 
rational? She acted in the same way he did towards his mother 
with every person she met. 
 
I grant that this would be a hard task for most of us to achieve, but her 
noble effort never to abandon anyone springs from an insight that Singer 
rejects over and over again: no person is replaceable, and no person ever 
loses their worth. Love, which clarifies the vision of the beloved, is an 
experience common to believers and non-believers alike, and so even 
though Singer is an atheist, these insights, which guided Blessed Mother 
Teresa’s life, are available to him through his experience with his mother. 
 
Singer dubs the view that all humans have equal and lofty worth, 
regardless of their cognitive abilities, “speciesism,” and holds that it has 
never been shown to be true by philosophers.lvi But his argument against 
(what he calls) speciesism in favor of killing those humans who have lost 
much of their cognitive abilities denies the deepest source of love intrinsic 
to persons: their uniqueness. Were he to reflect on his experience with his 
mother, he would see that no aspect of our species membership alone 
could be the intrinsic aspect of another which inspires love.lvii 
 
4. The Exterior and Cultural Unleashing of Love 
 
Does this emphasis on the interior growth of love mean that Christianity 
neglects the exterior goal of actually reducing suffering, and in particular 
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on a large-scale? I think the many examples of Christian charitable 
organizations and hospitals illustrate just the reverse. Also, in the document 
we are considering, the Pope spends a series of paragraphs reflecting on 
the parable of the Good Samaritan, which  
 
…witnesses to the fact that Christ’s revelation of the salvific 
meaning of suffering is in no way identified with an attitude of 
passivity. Completely the reverse is true. The Gospel is the 
negation of passivity in the face of suffering.lviii 
  
He points out that it is difficult to list in this sort of document all the types 
of “Good Samaritan” work that exist in the Church and in society, 
although he does name the profession of the doctor and the nurse with 
great enthusiasm, noting that these have an evangelical content raising 
them to the level of a vocation rather than a mere profession.lix And so, 
although there are times when the only way possible to help another is to 
offer compassion in the form of an interior love of the suffering person, the 
Good Samaritan does not stop at sympathy and compassion, but not 
sparing material meanslx goes to the point of making a gift of his whole 
being to the other – and this is accomplished in bringing actual help in 
suffering whatever its nature may be.lxi One of the documents of the 
Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes, teaches that interior love is a 
direct result of a genuine exterior giving of oneself, lxii and this giving can 
take many forms. 
 
Finally, I would like to mention the third way in which suffering is meant to 
unleash love: the bringing into existence of a civilization of love. In a 
civilization of love, large scale suffering would be greatly reduced, yet the 
realization of such a civilization is inseparably linked to the first of the 
three-fold senses in which suffering exists to unleash love: an interior, 
affective love of individual persons whom one faces. The following text 
from a daily meditation book concisely expresses this idea: 
 
The ultimate solution for restoring and promoting justice at all 
levels lies in the heart of each man. It is in the heart that every 
type of injustice imaginable comes into existence, and it is 
there also that the possibility of straightening out all human 
relationships is conceived.lxiii 
  
This idea suggests that the solution to worldwide suffering lies in the heart 
of each person. This inner life of persons is precisely that dimension of 
morality which is relegated to the sidelines in utilitarian ethics, and for this 
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reason it is incapable of achieving its own stated goal: the elimination of 
worldwide suffering. 
 
I said above, with Scheler, that this love in the inner life of persons for 
individuals, the love that Christ was hoping would blossom in the heart of 
the rich young man, can only blossom through concrete acts of self-giving, 
and for this reason it did not blossom in the heart of the rich young man. 
But I also think that the relief of suffering on a large scale will not occur on 
earth unless such love in the inner life of persons is present there.  
 
This point brings up the very difficult question concerning the emotional 
involvement of health care providers with their patients. It seems to me 
that the two extremes are, on the one hand, an exaggerated or unhealthy 
degree of personal involvement in the lives of patients, and on the other, a 
complete suppression of any and all affective relating to patients. Neither 
of these two extremes is appropriate. But, I do not think that the solution 
to the hardship on healthcare providers who feel appropriate emotions in 
their work can be the recommendation of extreme stoicism. 
 
With respect to interior love as the main source of the relief of suffering on 
earth, the Catholic tradition goes so far as to say that the completely 
cloistered religious, who appear to be doing nothing, actually bring about 
more good in the world, even in the form of concrete benefits to persons 
who are suffering. For example, in the following text of St. John of the 
Cross, he expresses just this view in his advice to persons who achieve the 
deepest form of union with God: 
 
It should be noted that until the soul reaches this state of 
union of love, she should practice love in both the active and 
contemplative life. Yet once she arrives, she should not 
become involved in other works and exterior exercises that 
might be of the slightest hindrance to the attentiveness of love 
toward God, even though the work be of great service to God. 
For a little of this pure love is more precious to God and the 
soul and more beneficial to the Church, even though it seems 
one is doing nothing, than all these other works put 
together.lxiv 
 
Yet, even on a more natural level, the cold-hearted calculating method 
presented by contemporary utilitarianism will fail. Only love, the kind that is 
present when two persons face each other in an attitude of care and 
respect, as opposed to a cold assessment of units of pain and preference 
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fulfillments, could lead to a society that truly cares for the suffering as 
persons. 
 
Thus, I think that the third sense in which suffering is meant to unleash 
love is intimately and necessarily connected to the first sense. 
5. Conclusion: The Inherently Self-defeating Structure of 
Utilitarian Ethics 
Since utilitarian ethics allows for the killing and abandonment of individual 
persons to achieve its stated goal of reducing overall suffering, it has 
actually doomed itself to failure from the outset. The link between the 
legalization of euthanasia and large-scale killing is not correctable through 
“guidelines,” but follows from an inner and unavoidable logic.lxv Not only 
has large-scale killing followed on the coattails of legalized euthanasia 
historically, but also the logical connection between the two can be 
demonstrated. I would formulate that reason like this: to kill or abandon 
one single human person, is in a certain sense just as horrible as killing or 
abandoning thousands. Since persons are irreplaceably precious, killing one 
of them represents an infinite crime, and so killing many is not a “greater” 
evil in a quantitative sense, such that when you reach a certain number (say 
100,000) only then does it become an immoral state of affairs.lxvi I am 
grateful to Dr. Maria Fedoryka for the following formulation: “killing many 
persons should be understood as a ‘greater’ evil in the sense that it is 
repeating many times over an already infinite crime of violating a unique 
person.” And so, if the killing of any person becomes allowed, then the 
only foundation on which one could oppose mass killing has been stripped 
from the equation. Only a person who understands this can truly bring 
about a civilization of love. 
On March 20, 2004, Pope John Paul II announced to the participants of an 
international conference entitled, “Life-Sustaining Treatments and 
Vegetative State: Scientific Advances and Ethical Dilemmas,” the following: 
I feel the duty to reaffirm strongly that the intrinsic value and 
personal dignity of every human being do not change, no 
matter what the concrete circumstances of his or her life. A 
man, even if seriously ill or disabled in the exercise of his 
highest functions, is and always will be a man, and he will 
never become a “vegetable” or an “animal.” Even our 
brothers and sisters who find themselves in the clinical 
condition of a “vegetative state” retain their human dignity in 
all its fullness.lxvii 
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Suffering is an unavoidable and overwhelming fact of life, yet John Paul II 
believes that one of the deepest meanings to be found within it, is its 
ability to “unleash love,” which if realized in individual cases, will 
eventually result in an entire civilization of love. There is, however, a strong 
temptation to think that people who are sick have lost their worth and do 
not deserve love and care. It is for this reason, it seems to me, that the 
Catechism of the Catholic Church insists that “Those whose lives are 
diminished or weakened deserve special respect;”lxviii not because they are 
worth more than the healthy, but because it is too easy for the healthy to 
forget that they still have all of their personal dignity. As soon as love 
comes into the picture, however, the right attitude towards individuals 
returns. Despite his experience with his mother, Peter Singer has yet to 
admit this in writing. His answer that he did wrong when he cared for his 
mother, as one of my students put it, “excuses his action, but does not 
express the motive for it.”lxix His critics are looking for that motive, and so I 
will suggest one: he did not kill his mother because he loves her, and this 
love made him see the reasons within her being for which she should not 
be killed.  
If utilitarians are sincere in their desire to bring about the greatest good for 
the greatest number of people, let them strive to achieve a civilization of 
love on the only basis possible: the inviolable preciousness of every person. 

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xli Specter, 1999, 55. 
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masterpiece in the Catholic tradition expressing the idea that fruitful external actions are only possible if 
they flow from a rich inner life is The Soul of the Apostolate (Rockford, IL: TAN Books and Publishers, 
2008) by Dom Jean-Baptiste Chautard. 
lxv For excellent discussions of this connection, see Wesley J. Smith, Forced Exit: The Slippery Slope from 
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